

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

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DRAFTED BY ACDA/PAB:RBFIREHOCK:GG

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:DLINEBAUGH

NSC:MHIGGINS

JCS:WGEORG

CIA:EHKNOCH

OSD/ISA:LMICHAE

PM/DCA:VBAKE

EUR/RPM:ESTREAT

ACDA/IR/REG:THIRSCHFELD

CUSHINN S/S:WHLUERS

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R 132153Z SEP 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR: ANALYSIS OF FRG SCHEME FOR FIXED POSTS

MONITORING OF PHASE I FORCE LEVELS

1. THE SUBJECT STUDY (TEXT SEPTEL) FULFILLS OUR COMMITMENT
TO THE FRG TO ANALYZE THEIR PROPOSAL--AS IT HAS BEEN
OUTLINED SO FAR--TO PERFORM POST-REDUCTION MONITORING
OF SOVIET FORCES AFTER A PHASE I MBFR AGREEMENT BY A

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SYSTEM OF FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS AT DESIGNATED ENTRY AND

EXIT POINTS FOR THE NGA. THE STUDY IS PURELY A TECHNICAL ONE AND SHOULD BE READ IN THE CONTEXT OF THE US OCTOBER 5, 1973 PAPER ON THE VARIOUS FORMS OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION. (FYI: ONE ISSUE STILL OUTSTANDING IS WHETHER SUCH A SYSTEM WHEN APPLIED TO US FORCES IN THE NGA WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO AND PRACTICAL FOR THE US. IF ASKED, YOU MAY SAY THE ISSUE IS STILL UNDER REVIEW. END FYI.)

2. ASIDE FROM ANSWERING GERMAN QUESTIONS, OUR PURPOSE IN PUTTING THIS STUDY FORWARD IS TO LET OUR ANALYSIS SPEAK FOR ITSELF. WHILE OUR VIEWS TEND TO SUPPORT UK PREFERENCE, WE WOULD PREFER THAT UK, FRG, AND OTHER ALLIES DEBATE THE ISSUE AMONG THEMSELVES FIRST. WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE ISSUE OF WHAT VERIFICATION SCHEME IS ULTIMATELY PUT FORWARD DEPENDS ON THE FORM OF THE REDUCTION ACTUALLY NEGOTIATED.

3. FOR BONN: PLEASE PASS THE STUDY TO INTERESTED FRG OFFICIALS, STATING THAT IT IS THOROUGH WORKING-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THEIR PROPOSAL. YOU SHOULD TELL THEM THAT WE PLAN TO TABLE THE PAPER IN BRUSSELS IN A WEEK OR SO FOR ALLIANCE DISCUSSION, AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THEIR INITIAL REACTIONS AND ANY FURTHER SPECIFICS OF THE SYSTEM THEY ENVISION.

4. FOR USNATO: YOU MAY WISH TO GIVE THE FRG REPRESENTATIVES A COPY AS WELL GIVING THEM (AND BONN) A WEEK OR SO TO DIGEST THE EXIT-ENTRY STUDY BEFORE PRESENTING IT TO THE WORKING GROUP IN BRUSSELS. WHEN TABLING THE STUDY IN THE WG, YOU SHOULD UNDERLINE (TO THE SPC AS WELL) THAT IT IS STRICTLY A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS.

5. FOR LONDON: WE SUGGEST THAT YOU NOT PASS THE STUDY ITSELF TO FCO, BUT YOU MAY INFORM INTERESTED UK OFFICIALS THAT WE PROPOSE TO INTRODUCE STUDY IN NATO ON GERMAN PROPOSAL IN A WEEK OR SO. (FYI: WE DO NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE WORKING WITH BRITISH AGAINST FRG. END FYI.)

6. (BEGIN BACKGROUND FYI) OVER THE PAST SEVERAL
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MONTHS, THE FRG HAS EXPRESSED INCREASING OPPOSITION TO THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYING MOBILE INSPECTORATES TO MONITOR THE LEVEL OF SOVIET AND US FORCES REMAINING IN THE NGA AFTER PHASE I MBFR WITHDRAWALS. THE GERMAN ALTERNATIVES TO MOBILE POST-REDUCTION MONITORING SO FAR PROPOSED ARE:

-- EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON "NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS";

-- CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS WHEN VIOLATIONS ARE SUSPECTED; AND

-- FIXED POSTS AT DESIGNATED ENTRY POINTS TO THE NGA.

THE GERMANS HAVE NOT EXPLICITLY REJECTED MOBILE MONITORING OF WITHDRAWALS THEMSELVES IF OF LIMITED AND FIXED DURATION, BUT THEIR LATEST PROPOSALS FOR WITHDRAWAL MONITORING ENVISION THE USE OF FIXED POSTS INSTEAD.

7. THE TECHNICAL PAPER SENT SEPTEL ASSESSES THE THIRD GERMAN ALTERNATIVE FOR POST-REDUCTION MONITORING IN TERMS OF ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION -TO NATO'S EFFORTS TO VERIFY SOVIET FORCE LEVELS IN THE NGA FOLLOWING A PHASE I WITHDRAWAL. IT IS INTENDED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS OF WHAT INSPECTION MEASURES THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE IN VIENNA AND TO

BE USED IN DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRG AND OTHER ALLIES.

8. THE PAPER DOES NOT TREAT THE APPLICATION OF THE ENTRY POINT CONCEPT TO US FORCES IN THE NATO PORTION OF THE NGA BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE US PRESENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE TRANSPORTATION PRACTICES BY WHICH THAT PRESENCE IS SUPPORTED DIFFER SO SHARPLY FROM THE SOVIET PRESENCE AND PRACTICES IN EASTERN EUROPE THAT A SYSTEM IN THE WESTERN NGA WOULD PROBABLY OWE MORE TO RECIPROCITY THAN TO TECHNICAL FACTORS. THE SOVIETS HAVE GROUPS OF FORCES IN ALL EASTERN NGA COUNTRIES WHILE THE US HAS SIGNIFICANT GROUND FORCES ONLY IN THE FRG (THERE ARE SMALL SUPPORT

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ELEMENTS IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS). THE SOVIETS PERFORM MOST OF THEIR ROUTINE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS IN TWO LARGE MOVEMENTS (SPRING AND FALL) AND MOVE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT BY A VARIETY OF MODES AND ROUTES. IN CONTRAST, THE US REPLACES PERSONNEL INDIVIDUALLY THROUGHOUT THE YEAR AND ALL PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS CURRENTLY MOVE THROUGH A SINGLE AIRPORT (FRANKFURT/RHINE MAIN) AND ALL EQUIPMENT THROUGH ONE PORT (BREMERHAVEN) AND ONE AIRPORT (RAMSTEIN). US TROOPS INTRODUCED FOR REFORGER EXERCISES ALSO ARRIVE BY AIR (THROUGH RHINE MAIN, RAMSTEIN AB, AND STUTTGART/ECHTERDINGEN) WITH A SMALL AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT, THEN MARRY UP WITH PREPOSITIONED UNIT SETS. THUS, AN "ENTRY POINT" MONITORING SYSTEM RESPONSIVE TO CURRENT US PRACTICE WOULD WATCH ONLY THREE AIRPORTS AND A

SINGLE PORT, ALL ON WEST GERMAN TERRITORY.

9. THE WEST GERMANS ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY MONITORING SYSTEM RESTRICTED TO FRG TERRITORY (WHICH THEY SEE AS CREATING A "SPECIAL ZONE") AND WOULD PROBABLY INSIST THAT THE US DESIGNATE ENTRY POINTS IN THE BENELUX COUNTRIES AND THAT THE WARSAW PACT BE AUTHORIZED TO INSPECT THESE. REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR BENELUX ALLIES HAVE INDICATED THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. EXACTLY WHAT THE WARSAW PACT WOULD INSIST ON IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORECAST, BUT IT WOULD PROBABLY SEEK AT LEAST ROUGH SYMMETRY IN THE EXTENT AND SIZE OF ITS INSPECTORATE IN THE NATO PORTION OF THE NGA.

10. THE US HAS NOT DECIDED WHETHER IT WOULD FIND IT ACCEPTABLE OR DESIRABLE TO DESIGNATE ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS OTHER THAN THOSE NOW ACTUALLY USED BY US FORCES OR WHETHER, IF ADDITIONAL POINTS WERE DESIGNATED, IT WOULD BE PRACTICAL TO ACTUALLY MOVE THROUGH THESE POINTS. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MONITORING, IT WOULD

BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO NATO TO HAVE INSPECTORS AT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MAJOR ENTRY POINTS ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE. IF THE PACT INSISTS ON ROUGH SYMMETRY OR RECIPROCITY IN THE EXTENT OF COVERAGE OR NUMBER OF POSTS, HOWEVER, THIS COULD RESULT EITHER IN A LARGER

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NUMBER OF POSTS ON THE NATO SIDE THAN THE US (AND OTHERS) WOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE OR PRACTICAL OR A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF POSTS ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE. IF NATO DECIDED TO ASK FOR ONLY A FEW POSTS ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE, THIS NUMBER MIGHT NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMMODATE NORMAL SOVIET ENTRIES AND EXITS. AND, BY LEAVING UNWATCHED MOST OF THE MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES A SMALL FIXED POST SYSTEM WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE EASE WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD UNDERTAKE A MAJOR VIOLATION.

11. THUS, UNTIL THE US DECIDES WHETHER AND HOW AN ENTRY-EXIT POINT SYSTEM OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION COULD BE APPLIED TO US FORCES IN THE NGA, IT IS DIFFICULT TO FORECAST WHAT SUCH A SYSTEM COULD LOOK LIKE. THE ATTACHED PAPER ASSUMES THAT IF NATO DECIDES TO PROPOSE SUCH A SYSTEM, IT WILL BE A REASONABLY COMPREHENSIVE ONE.

12. FINALLY IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT A FIXED-POST SYSTEM COVERING MAJOR ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS ON THE USSR'S BORDERS WITH POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD REQUIRE

BETWEEN 18 AND 35 FIXED POSTS (AS DESCRIBED SEPTEL),
WHILE THE CURRENT US PRACTICE WOULD REQUIRE ONLY 3 AIRPORTS
AND ONE PORT AS POSTS. THE EAST IS LIKELY TO OBJECT
STRONGLY TO SO ASYMMETRICAL A PROPOSAL OR MIGHT
DEMAND THAT ADDITIONAL POINTS BE DESIGNATED TO INSPECT
BRITISH, CANADIAN, AND FRENCH ENTRIES AND EXITS FROM THE
NGA. THIS COULD BE EITHER TO VERIFY PHASE II WITHDRAWALS
OR TO VERIFY NATO'S TOTAL CEILING AT THE END OF PHASE I.
SUCH DEMANDS, IF MET, NOT ONLY WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE
THE SIZE OF THE EASTERN INSPECTORATE, BUT MIGHT ALSO
CAUSE DIFFICULTIES IN GAINING FRENCH AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT
THE ENTRIES AND EXITS OF THEIR FORCES (END BACKGROUND FYI).
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